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The level of public and private involvement in economic activity in societies has 
changed over time. One may talk about the existence of a cyclical trend in which the 
most important periods of public governance are replaced by periods in which private 
management dominates the situation. This phenomenon may also be observed in local 
areas. Some authors have pointed out the existence of an alternation in the provision of 
municipal services, resulting in periods dominated by governance compared to other 
stages dominated by private management. In order to illustrate this cyclical trend at  
local level, this paper intends to analyze the evolution of the governance of the Spanish 
water supply since the mid-nineteenth century to the present day.  Recent evidence from 
the industry suggests the  possibility that we may currently be witnessing a further 
change in the trend. 
KEYWORDS: Local Government, urban water supply, privatization, municipalization. 
------ 
 
Local government obligations have increased over time. Councils are currently 
responsible for the provision of a wide range of services in their municipalities, ranging 
from core activities to the proper functioning of cities, such as refuse collection, traffic 
control or water distribution, as well as activities with social purposes,  such as the care 
of the elderly or the development of leisure activities. 
Regarding the provision of public services, the choice of an appropiate management, 
either public or private, is a recurring debate. The existence of opposing arguments and 
the absence of conclusive empirical evidence in favour of one kind of management or 
the other, have prompted several studies since the mid-80s to explain what factors 
influence  the choice of  management for local public utilities. Recent surveys suggest 
 4 




Research explaining the decisions of local governments using econometric techniques 
analyze what happened in the last quarter of the twentieth century, although these 
decisions were made much earlier. In the absence of data, only historical studies enable 
us to approach the motivations of local politicians in their past decisions. One important 
conclusion reached in studies from a historical perspective is the existence of a cyclical 
trend in decision-making based on governance and private management alternating. 
Gómez-Ibáñez (2003) associates this cyclical trend mainly to those services based on 
network infrastructures which suffer from significant failures in free competition
2
. This 
situation has been detected, for example,  in the case of transport services
3
 or the water 
supply
4
. In this same line of reasoning, some authors suggest that we are witnessing a 
new trend in  services provided by local governments in the last decade
5
. 
To illustrate the cyclical trend in local government decisions, including the possible 
change in trend noted by some authors in recent years, this paper analyzes the evolution 
of the governance of the Spanish urban water supply. Despite the lack of data that 
makes it impossible for us to apply econometric techniques to past periods, this paper 
presents economic, political and institutional arguments which serve to explain the 
decisions made by local governments in each period (see table 1). The start of the study 
period is determined by the development of the Modern System of Water Supply in 
Spanish cities
6
. This issue is addressed in the second section. The factors that explain 
the decisions of local governments in each historical period are explained in the third, 
fourth and fifth sections. Finally, to conclude, the sixth section raises the possibility that 
we may be witnessing a new change of trend. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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 centuries witnessed the recurring collapse of traditional water supply 
and sanitation systems in many European cities. The causes must be sought in the sharp 
increase in water demand and in the growth of urban agglomerations.  
New and growing industrial needs led to a sharp increase in water demand. People 
initially attempted to solve this problem by strengthening the Clasic System of Water 
Supply
7
. For instance, more wells and water sources were constructed and the service of 
vendors providing water were increased*
1
. All these solutions were costly and 
inadequate and, needless to say, they did not prevent a decline in the available flow in 
wells and the consequent problems with the water supply. 
The strong growth of cities and excessive urban concentration, with the emergence of 
large diseconomies of concentration that were not present in rural areas, ended up 
collapsing the sanitation system and creating a true classic situation of environmental 
neglect
8
. Contamination of drinking water and the occurrence of severe unsanitary 




Overcoming this situation was only going to be possible by modernizing water supply 
and sanitation services. From a technical point of view, this involved the construction of 
large dams and aqueducts for storage and transport of water over long distances; the 
establishment of distribution networks and sanitation; the introduction of new systems 
for water filtration and disinfection (i.e., chlorination); the settlement of pressurized 
piping; the diffusion of steam engines to raise water, or the use of valves to regulate the 
flow of water. 
 6 
In Spain, it took a long time to adopt this necessary process of modernization in all 
matters relating to treatment, water supply and sanitation. Not only was this a technical 
challenge, but also a financial and organizational one. Dealing with gaps in supply and 
sanitation infrastructure entailed a large investment in fixed capital, and all in a context 
in which policy-makers –the city councils– were under severe financial constraints 
inherited from the Old Regime crisis. 
Consequently, those services that did not require a large investment, such as health or 
education, continued to be managed directly by the councils themselves. In contrast, the 
water supply and sanitation services, as well as street lighting and the tram service, 
gradually began to be managed indirectly by private companies, usually under 
concession or lease contracts. However, despite privatization, the legislation created for 




In Spain, some authors have come to distinguish three stages according to the unequal 
importance of private enterprises in the management of the urban water supply
11
. The 
first stage (1840-1938)  witnessed the start of entrepreneurship in industry. However, it 
was not until the early twentieth century when this management strategy became 
consolidated. The second stage (1939-1984) is characterized by a strong process of 
municipalization due to both social and political reasons. The third stage (from 1985 
onwards) has brought further growth in private participation in management, justified 






FIRST STAGE. THE INITIATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF PRIVATE 
COMPANIES IN THE WATER SECTOR (1840-1938) 
 
In the late 19
th
 century, Spanish cities still had to perform tasks such as the construction 
of water supply networks and resolving technical problems, the establishment of an 
efficient and stable organizational model, as well as the stabilization of users and the 
spread of the water supply
12
. The complexity and magnitude of the investments required 
to modernize urban water utilities placed nineteenth-century Spanish politicians in the 
dilemma of choosing between continuing to manage the service directly or to delegate 
management to private companies. 
Even though some private business initiatives had been detected in the sector as early as 
1841*
2
, a more determined push from private iniciatives did not occur until  1865-1872. 
From that moment until the end of the century, 83 private companies were established 
in Spain (see Table 2), located mainly in medium-sized and large cities. However, there 
were also some cases of private initiatives in small cities and, conversely, in some 
important cities −Almeria, Bilbao, Zaragoza, Malaga, Las Palmas, Palma de Mallorca 
and San Sebastian− private companies were not present until 1900
13
.  
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Nonetheless, private participation in the management of urban water during these years 
was weak and supported significantly by foreign investment (see Table 3). It was 
normal to see companies with both domestic and foreign capital. On the one hand, we 
must consider that Spanish entrepreneurs did not make a firm commitment by investing 
in an emerging sector in development. In addition, the small and medium-sized 
enterprises that were established at the beginning in the sector often proved to be 
unsustainable. On the other hand, British, French and Belgian entrepreneurs already had 
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a thorough knowledge of the sector as well as major builders, managers and investors 
who were able to recognize the potential of economies of scale in the sector
14
.  
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
This management strategy consolidated during the first third of the 20
th
 century. By 
1938, 166 private companies responsible for managing water utilities had already been 
established in Spain (see Table 2), many of which were large scale operations. In this 
period, the development of the water supply in Spain was strongly associated to the 
great public urban projects of the time –docks, urban enlargements, renewals of 
buildings, etc.– Furthermore, the extension of the water supply network to new urban 
areas provoked the immediate re-evaluation of sites and properties
15
. 
However, what were the reasons behind delegating the management of a service 
traditionally provided by city councils to private companies during this period? The 
literature suggests three explanatory factors which are detailed below. 
 
1) Budgetary imbalances and inadequate financial resources 
 
Since the early 19
th 
century, the impoverished state of Spanish municipal finances was 
reflected in the financial diversity,  heavy indebtedness and the guardianship of a State 
interested in  Local Revenue
16
. There are several possible reasons for this situation. 
Firstly, the sale of municipal assets, which had begun during the Peninsular War (1808-
1814), continued in subsequent decades and escalated during the Carlist War years 
(1833-1876). Secondly, although the 1845 tax reform achieved an increase of municipal 
revenues, the needs generated by the large influx of people into cities resulted in these 
financial resources remaining inadequate. Finally, the subordination of Local Finances 
to the State was consolidated
17
. During the 19
th
 century, the increase in municipal 
 9 
responsibilities −primary education, charity, local public works, landscaping, etc.− was 
not accompanied by a corresponding transfer of state taxes. Thus, the financial capacity 
of municipalities was even further restricted. 
Moreover, the necessary investments to establish the service of urban water supplies 
were disproportionate to the resources in local government coffers
18
. 
Between 1900 and 1905, the construction of water supply networks required an average 
investment of 2.31 million “pesetas”*
3
 per project, or an investment of 41.5 “pesetas” 




As a result, Spanish councils only directly managed those municipal services that did 
not require hefty investments, and when  public works could be undertaken over several 
years (e.g., the case of the cemeteries). In contrast, the water supply service required 
substantial investments which could not be spread over several years. Also, more 
complex industrial and commercial organization was required, so councils ended up 








 century Spanish policy was characterized by The Peninsular War, the Carlist 
conflict and the continuous alternation between Progressive and Moderate ideologies in 
power. These circumstances greatly hindered the necessary reform of local government 
finances. The financing of the foregoing wars demanded incomes from anywhere and  
the Local Revenue resources  were increasingly utilized for this purpose. Futhermore, a 
common practice was to reduce municipal taxes in times of peace, as they were 
considered  an obstacle to the recovery of the State. Arguably, the growing indebtedness 
 10 
resulting from the centralization of State Finances eventually put an end to the 
autonomy of Local Revenue
21
. 
The arrival of the Liberals to power did not lead to changes in the structure of municipal 
expenditures. Unlike private companies, which had their own capital and funds,  Local 
Governments issued debt to fund public works. The main item of expenditure was made 
up of debt interest, which in cities like Madrid and Valladolid was as high as 30%. In 
the “Ecclesiastical Confiscations of Madoz (1855)”*
4
, the State ended up bankrupting 
municipalities, as the State did not respect its commitments to repaying the public debt 
which it had forced them to issue. The centralization imposed left  Local Governments 
without their own resources and without the possibility of levying taxes. This led them 




Finally, irregularities were widespread at the time. Fraud was considered  normal in the 
management of assets and real income and  interest and interference in local coffers was 




3) Ideological Attitudes 
 
Since the early 19
th
 century, in view of the visible relationship between capitalist 
development and urbanization, liberal politicians tried to direct  private investment 
towards urban centers. The aim was to reduce the limitations and restrictions imposed 
on Local Governments so that they could implement certain urban services
24
. However, 
in the first half of the 19
th
 century, the private initiative encountered serious difficulties 
to make large investments. Consequently, the slow modernization of the water supply 
was not an exceptional case. The same happened to services such as transportation or 
 11 
street lighting. However, not until the late 19
th
 century did the largest entrepreneurship 
in the water sector begin. 
Moreover, the ideological principles of economic liberalism were compatible with the 
transfer of public service management to private companies. In that context, private 
companies were considered more efficient due to not having to go through as much red 
tape as public companies. Furthermore, private companies were not subject to such rigid  
budgetary control. In contrast, government agencies lacked flexibility and  did not have 
the management capacity or the financial, technical and human resources to undertake 
the necessary investments. For the liberal politicians of the time, services which did not 
have a sovereign status and, moreover, were of an economic nature, should be managed 




SECOND STAGE. THE MUNICIPALIZATION OF THE WATER SUPPLY (1939-
1984) 
 
While during the 19
th
 century concession and lease arrangements were considered the 
most appropriate form of urban service management, this began to be questioned on a 




. But while the municipalization 
of water utilities became more popular in theoretical terms, there were two important 
obstacles in practice. Firstly, the legislative principles advocated for a liberal conception 
in the organization of urban services. And secondly, the serious financial problems of 
municipalities limited any action in this direction. 
As the 20
th
 century wore on, a strong debate emerged over whether or not to 
municipalize public services and more specifically, the urban water supply. The offer 
made by  private companies was considered unstable, expensive and inadequate and 
 12 
potentially contrary to the general interests of the Nation. This controversy was even 
greater in large cities, where there were major supply problems. 
Local services managed by concessionaire companies often suffered major 
dysfunctions: fraud against Local Finances, breach of contract or lack of renovation and 
improvement in the quality of service provision. Moreover, in the cases where the end 
of the concession approached, concessionaires were reluctant to make investments in 
maintenance and improve the service, as there were more difficulties in the short-term 
to recover the investment. In addition to this, the lack of supervision and control on 
behalf of city councils degenerated into situations of shortages, supply cuts and frequent 
leakages due to aging pipes, leaving a clear picture of efficiency loss by concessionary 
companies. The fact that private companies monopolized the service showed that 




In a legal context, the establishment of the “Estatuto Municipal de 1924” (i.e., a 
Municipal Law), during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera marked an important shift 
in trend. This Municipal Law gave more power to  local governments and more control 
over municipal activities. In other respects, state aids and subsidies to carry out 
implementation works and improvements in the service began to be granted, which is 
why the first municipalizations in the urban water supply were observed at this time*
5
. 
However, this local authority process was intensified during the Franco dictatorship. 
From 1940,  County Councils, Public Utility Commissions, The Ministry of Public 
Works and some other public bodies began to subsidize the works of the water supply in 
a higher percentage of the budgets of each work. Besides, the “Reglamento de Servicios 
de la Corporaciones Locales de 1956” (i.e., Local Authority Service Regulations) was 
passed, which further increased autonomy and local powers and also caused a sharp 
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contraction of private capital in the sector and the gradual withdrawal of  concessionary 
companies
27
. As a result, the obstacles which prevented the municipalization of these 
services were reduced. 
Between 1939 and 1969, only 22 companies were established in the private sector,  
8.12% of total companies established between 1841 and 1969 (see Table 2). In 1950 
private companies accounted for just over 32% of the water supply sector, a total of 
1,168 entities for water supply. And in 1970 only 7% of water supply services were 
managed by private companies, which accounted for 25% of the total Spanish 
population supplied
28
. However, some private companies established before the Civil 
War managed to survive the interventionist onslaught (see Table 4) and also staged 
implementation and improvement works, albeit to a much lesser extent. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
In view of these facts, what factors explain increased public intervention and the return 
to  direct management of the  urban water supply in this period? 
 
1) Market failures 
 
The character of natural monopoly in the urban water supply was a common argument 
to justify government intervention. The lack of interest from private companies to 
extend their activities beyond  densely populated urban areas, obviously due to the  lack 
of profitability, led to an underprovision of the water supply. 
Although the problems of water supply in large cities were never entirely solved, the 
situation in small cities was even worse. On the one hand, private companies were 
unwilling to settle in these cities because they were unable to exploit economies of 
scale. On the other hand, city councils put strong pressure on private companies through 
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tight controls on water rates. Finally, the Councils in smaller cities did not have 
sufficient resources to carry out the extension and improvement works required. Thus, 
investments by small municipalities were reduced to the installation of some public 
drinking fountains and water holes, or  the construction of a public washhouse. 
To address the backlog in the water supply in small cities, the National Supply Plan of 
1966 estimated an investment required of 120,000 million “pesetas” between 1966-
1981. The overall situation was not very propitious. Out of the 1,500 surveyed 
population centers −header counties and areas of expansion− 32% did not have drinking 
water supplied to their homes, 48% had no distribution network and 75% had no 
purification plant. Average water consumption was 102 litres per inhabitant and per 
day, whereas 60% of the population lacked sewage services and 78% had no sewage 
treatment plant
29
. In these circumstances, private companies were unable to participate 
in the benefits of improving this service, so they would not have the same incentives as 
local public bodies would  to invest in expanding and improving the service. 
 
2) Incomplete contracts and transaction costs 
 
Throughout the modernization of water utilities, dominated by the prívate sector, not 
only were regulations relatively lax, but City Councils were also unconcerned about 
whether or not concessionarie companies complied with the terms of the contracts they 
had signed. However,  greater control and supervision of the service would have meant 
an increase in transaction costs making the provision of the service less efficient. In 
addition, the financial situation of city councils was not at its best to carry out such 
practices. It is also very likely that municipalities were not aware of the limitations of 
 15 
competition in network services, especially for the urban water supply, which is 
reflected in long concession contracts of up to 99 years. 
Furthermore,  irregularities were quite common in this period: missed deadlines, few 
bidders in  public auctions, suspiciously easy conditions for contract negotiation, 
together with a large presence of local politicians in this type of business and no 
apparent interest in defending the rights of citizens
30
. In short, there was hardly any 
public control of contract compliance, so  private companies, both domestic and foreign, 
had total freedom to develop their own business policies
31
.  
Consequently, not only was there a  lack of investment in maintenance and 
improvement of the service. Municipal governments were incapable of regulating and 
controlling concessionaires, which meant that many city councils eventually ended up 
managing the municipal urban water supply themselves. 
 
3) Political Processes and Ideological Attitudes 
 
The process of intense urbanization and industrialization continued in Spain in the 20
th
 
century. This process had always been associated with a strong increase in water 
demand for both domestic and industrial uses. Urban water utilities were often 
confronted with severe systemic problems. To meet this rising demand, large 
investments were needed in works related to the water supply, such as new projects for 
dams and long aqueducts. However, the country had chosen a more intense economic 
nationalism since  Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and especially during Franco’s 
regime
32




The “Confederaciones Hidrográficas”, i.e. Regional Water Authorities, whose mission 
was to ensure the availability and quality of water for different demands, were created 
 16 
during the second decade of the 20th century. As a result,  the control of the urban water 
supply was left in the hands of a group of state officials who dictated the policies to be 
followed. This new situation caused the displacement of private enterprises when 
making important decisions concerning this sector. 
Moreover, in the mid-20
th
 century, there was a strong controversy over water rates. 
Water supply companies argued that the cost of the service should be borne by users
34
. 
However, during Franco’s regime,  rates were frozen due to,  among other reasons, the 
need to establish anti-inflationary policies. This move led to a loss of corporate 
profitability in the sector and also hindered the technological renovation and expansion 
of supply networks. Both factors were behind the reasons for less concession contracts 
being signed, as well  as the subsequent municipalization of the urban water supply 
during this period. Finally, concession contracts were due to end in the second half of 
the 20
th
 century, especially for those concessionaire companies which had started their 
activity in the last third of the 19
th
 century. In most cases  concessions were not 
extended. Nevertheless, as water rates could not be updated, the service was sometimes 




THIRD STAGE. THE RETURN TO OUTSOURCING MANAGEMENT 
(SINCE 1985) 
 
Since 1985, although more rapidly since the 90s,  Spanish city councils have returned to  
outsourcing  the management of the urban water supply, a situation to which the new 
legal framework has undoubtedly contributed. After the implementation of the law 
7/1985 of April 2, which regulated local government, the responsibility for this service 
was maintained in the hands of city councils. This allowed them to choose between 
 17 
different forms of governance, mainly,  direct management or delegating this task  to 
either a public company, a private company, or a public-private partnership. 
Unlike previous periods, we have more and better statistical information on the 
incidence of different forms of management in Spanish municipalities at this stage. 
All this information is based on the design of surveys, although none of these are 
censuses. This explains why the results obtained from various sources do not  coincide 
entirely. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of different forms of ownership in management during the 
period of 1998-2004. Data were collected from the biennial survey of the Spanish 
Association of Water Supply and Sanitation
35
. Of all the available surveys, this one uses 
the largest sample, making it the most frequently used in the literature
36
, although not 
without certain problems. For instance, the earliest surveys −from 1992, 1994 and 
1996– show erratic results regarding the percentages of people who were served by 
different forms of ownership in management. This is probably due to the significant 
bias that these early surveys showed beacuse of the low level of response to 
questionnaires. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Once again the question of what factors explain this upward trend in privatist positions 
arises. In recent years there have been several empirical studies that have addressed this 
same issue for the Spanish case
37
. Although the debate is not closed, some of the most 






1) Fiscal Restrictions 
 
The previous phase (1939-1969) is characterized by an economically strong state 
intervention. As regards the water sector, these interventions resulted in  strong control 
of  activity and in a firm policy of state aid. However, despite the activity of the General 
Management of Water Resources, the processing, construction and operation of works 
related to the urban water supply was largely insufficient
38
.  
In the late '70s.  political instability caused by the change of regime, the economic crisis 
and  inflation, eventually determined a major tax reform. The main objectives of this 
reform were to reduce public debt and curb  inflation. This new context was a major 
constraint on government subsidies to municipalities and  city councils were subjected 
to two important financial constraints. On one hand,  a limited capacity to generate their 
own resources and, on the other hand, a drastic reduction in government subsidies 
aimed at maintaining and improving the water supply. 
Thus, many city councils were in need of approximating the price of service to its real 
value. Otherwise, simply maintaining the service would have made municipal budgets 
significantly unstable. From that time onwards, local politicians began to reconsider  
outsourcing  the governance of water utilities as an attractive option. The privatization 
of the governance of water has often been seen as a low cost option to carry out a direct 
policy of increases in water rates
39
.   
 
2) Cost reduction 
 
There has been a steady increase in the salaries of government emplyees since the late 
80’s. This trend can be attributed to the need to attract a more skilled workforce from 
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the private sector, but especially to increased trade union pressure in public 
employment. This situation, along with the financial difficulties suffered by local 
governments of the time, required facing a cost reduction, and privatization might be the 
answer to this problem. Especially since the late 70's, the first econometric studies were 
made in the USA, aimed at trying to link the costs of providing the water utility and 
how  the service is managed, either by the public or private sector. These studies 
seemed to offer  evidence that outsourcing to private companies was associated to lower 
costs of service provision
40
.  
The explanation of this fact is provided by the public choice theory. According to this 
approach, when the production of public services is monopolized by politicians and 
bureaucrats, the result is an oversupply of public services and, therefore, a clear 
situation of inefficiency. The solution put forward in this context is to introduce 
competition into the market of public services through tenders and auctions to award the 
running of the service. Nevertheless, the question is whether or not  outsourcing  a local 
service through public tenders  introduces real competition in the sector
41
.  
Another way of reducing costs is to exploit the economies of scale in the sector. The 
optimal scale in the urban water supply oftentimes tends to be higher than in the 
municipal district. Therefore a more efficient way would be to extend the service to 
other municipalities in order to aggregate demand and increase the scale of operations. 
Thus, a useful strategy to achieve this optimal operational scale could be to contract out 
the service to a private company. 
However, when compared to the previous argument, outsourcing services does not seem 
to be the only possible way of aggregating demand. Intermunicipal cooperation −i.e., 
through a consortium− may achieve the same results. A more efficient scale could be 
achieved through cooperation among smaller municipalities, even though it is true that 
 20 
intermunicipal cooperation is compatible with both public governance and private 
management of a service
42
.   
  
3) Political Processes and Ideological Attitudes 
 
Local politicians do not make decisions concerning the management of public services 
based solely on economic grounds. In the analysis of the motivations that underlie 
policy decisions in a democratic system, from the citizen-candidate approach
43
, the 
importance of two factors is highlighted. Firstly, political interest, understood as the 
priority of winning the elections and gaining access to or remaining in power. Secondly,  
politicians will tend to prefer a series of policies over others in accordance with their 
ideology of society. 
If a politician pursues electoral success, the presence of interest groups may be an 
important factor in the decision making process. Thus, in those municipalities where the 
level of trade union membership is high, direct management or outsourcing to a public 
company will be the most popular choice. In contrast, in those municipalities where 
there is a well-articulated business network with influential business groups, other  
privatization options will be more present. 
Finally, the ideological orientation of the party that governs the municipality may 
determine the predominant mode of management. Right-wing political parties are 
initially expected to promote the outsourcing of water utilities, while left-wing parties 






ARE WE  FACING A NEW CHANGE OF  TREND? 
 
Throughout this paper a cyclical trend in the management of water utilities in Spain has 
been proved, similar to that observed in other countries. Since the modernization of  
water utilities began in the mid-nineteenth century, there have been periods in which the 
weight of private participation and public management of the service have alternated. 
Even though a significant volume of the Spanish population is supplied water by a 
private company since the last cycle of privatizations, there are signs that this form of 
management is no longer expanding (see Figure 1). Firstly, civil society is becoming 
increasingly reluctant to new announcements of privatization in the industry. Secondly, 
the decisions of local governments at the beginning of the century point  to new forms 
of management. In some cities, the expectations for private enterprises have not been 
met, whereas in other cases the private sector has not achieved the expected profitability 
of their business. 
In this context we wonder whether we are at the beginning of a new phase of the cycle. 
The beginning of this possibly new cycle sees the trend to privatize being bucked. On 
the one hand, the number of full privatizations appears to be decreasing in recent years. 
On the other hand, there are cases of reversion reported by other authors in other places 
of the world. Some city councils are changing their initial decision to privatize and  
water utilities are now being contracted back to the Public Sector
44
.  
Faced with the option of privatizing, other governance arrangements attractive to local 




• Some public companies, such as EMASESA, are showing that it is 
possible to introduce certain improvements stemming from  private 
management in public companies. The announced increased efficiency of 
 22 
private over public management in the '70s has not been demonstrated to 




• The public-private company is acquiring a more prominent role. In this 
legal form, the capital is shared between a private partner and a public 
partner, usually the city council. This formula allows leveraging the 
know-how of the private company in  day-to-day running of the service, 
without losing the more direct control of the social interests of citizens 
exercised by the public partner. Another advantage of this type of 
company is that it reduces transaction costs as it decreases the cost of 
monitoring the performance of private operators.  
 
• Another option that is becoming more popular is the possibility of 
integrating the management of the water supply into a legal type of 
consortium. This formula is especially recommended for small 
municipalities. This cooperation between municipalities allows them to 
expand the service area and therefore take advantage of the significant 




It is undoubtedly still too early to confirm that we are in a new phase of the cycle, but 
there are already signs that are worth researchers looking into. Not enough time has 
passed as yet, a more accurate picture of this possible change more likely to be available 





*1 Footnote: The water boy or vendor providing water (i.e., “aguador” in Spanish), was 
a profession in Spain that existed well into the 20
th 
century. This job consisted of 
carrying clay jars of water, often with the help of a mule, to the city squares or the 
higher areas of the city where access to water was more difficult. Ultimately, it was 
street selling of water permitted by the municipal autorities.  
*2 Footnote: E.g. the company “Mina Pública de Aguas de Tarrasa S.A.” was 
established in 1841. 
*3 Footnote: The “peseta” was the official Spanish currency when performing these 
calculations. 
*4 Footnote: The Ecclesiastical Confiscations of Madoz recorded a much higher level of 
sales than all of the above. However,  historians have traditionally written much more 
about the Ecclesiastical Confiscations of Mendizabal. Overall, around 30% of assets 
were sold to the church, 20% to charity and 50% became city-owned property, mostly 
from villages. 
*




Footnote: One example of a reversion to the local council before contract expiry was 
the English company Seville Water Work Co. Ltd., which supplied water to Seville and 
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Table 1. Water Supply Governance in Spain  
 





Table 2. Urban water supply companies  
established in Spain (1841-1969) 
Period 
Number of companies 
Established 
Percentage of companies 
established 
1841-1900 83 30.63 
1900-1938 166 61.25 
1939-1969 22 8.12 
TOTAL 271 100 















2nd Stage. The 
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3th Stage. Return to 







- Budgetary imbalances 
and lack of funding 
 
- Political instability 
 
- Ideological attitudes 
- Market failures 
 
- Incomplete contracts 
and transaction costs 
 
-  Political Processes 
and Ideological 
Attitudes 
- Fiscal Restrictions 
 
- Cost reduction 
 





Table 3. Estimation of foreign investment 
 in the water sector, 19
th
 century Spain 
Country 
 
Total investments  
(in pesetas at the time) 
 
 
Percent of total  
foreign investment 
 
France 19,768,750 48.60 
England 14,059,900 34.57 
Belgium 6,843,750 16.83 
TOTAL 40,672,400 100.00 




Table 4. Survivor companies in 1985 
 
Company Year Municipalty 
Mina Pública de Aguas de Tarrasa 1841 Tarrasa 
Aguas de Barcelona 1882 Barcelona 
Aguas de Burgos 1889 Burgos 
Aguas Potables y Mejoras de Valencia 1890 Valencia 
Aguas de Alicante 1898 Alicante 
Omniun Ibérico 1902 Alcira 
Aguas de la Coruña 1903 La Coruña 
Aguas Potables de Palamós 1903 Palamós 
Aguas Potables de Barbastro 1905 Barbastro 
Aguas Potables de Alcázar de San Juan 1908 Alcázar de San Juan 
Aguas y Alcantarillado de Manzanares 1918 Manzanares 
Sociedad Española de Abastecimientos 1918 Valencia 
Agua de Rigat 1923 Igualada 
Gran Acueducto 1928 Villanueva y Geltrú 
Aguas del Rio Besós 1934 Barcelona 






Figure 1. Importance of different types of water utility management  


























Direct management Public company Private company Public-private  company
 
Source: Compiled from database AEAS (Asociación Española de Abastecimientos de Agua y 
Saneamiento), several years. 
 
